Yet Another Taxi Post

Casual readers of this blog might assume that we have no interests beyond coffee and taxis. That image will not be dispelled by this post.

In the last year, we've twice noted the expansion of Pyongyang's taxi fleet on this blog (here and here). It's happened again, with a new company on the scene, sporting bigger cars and more obvious branding. The new fleet's classy crimson and gold is broken up by the white KKG logo on the side, the first taxi company to be branded so blatantly. KKG is the company that is supposedly developing a stretch of the Taedonggang waterfront.

vroom vroom.

vroom vroom.

The cars are Chinese-made Hawtai Lu Sheng E70s, a roomy sedan that is much bigger than the cars used by other taxi fleets. It appears as if the KKG taxis have literally crowded out other players: fewer of the green 'Beijing Taxis' seem to be on the streets and we were told that many had been sent to service markets in other, presumably less lucrative cities. Perhaps over the past year the limits of the Pyongyang market have been reached.

Oh...and we will post more about coffee soon, too.

China News Service on DPRK's new SEZs

Last week, the DPRK announced new special economic zones (6 appears to be the number reported, though we were told 7 last week by an official). It was widely covered in Chinese media, an example of which is below. Interestingly, the only commentary provided in this piece is from a South Korean scholar, who goes unnamed.


North Korea newly open up several economic zones to attract foreign investment and stimulate development


From: China News

Date: 07/23/14

According to various foreign media, on July 23th the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly established a decree declaring that the decision to set up several economic zones in Pyongyang, South Hwanghae, Nampo, South Pyongan and North Pyongan has been made.

As reported, the DPRK plans to set up a high technology development zone in Pyongyang, a international green demonstration zone in South Hwanghae, a industrial and agriculture development zone in South Pyongan, a touristic zone in North Pyongan, and an export processing zone in Nampo. Thus, the number of North Korean economic zones will increase to 19.

Last year in November, the DPRK government designated 13 economic zones, including the Yalu River Economic Zone, Sinpyong Touristic Zone, Manpo Economic Zone, etc.

Furthermore, North Korea also decided to rename the “Sinuiju Special Economic Zone” in North Pyongan to the “Sinuiju International Economic Zone”. Last month, North Korea subsumed the Joint Venture and Investment Committee with National Economic Development Committee into the Ministry of Trade, and also renamed “the  Ministry of Trade” as “the Ministry of External Economy”, and thus achieved the integration of ways to attract foreign capitals.

A professor in the Institute of Far Eastern Studies from Kyungnam University said that North Korean actions reflect the purpose of using economic zones to develop economy, and renaming the Sinuiju Economic Zone means to give the initiative to foreign companies and improve the level of development.

Research and Translation by Wang Xing Yu

Not covered in recent SEZ news

Participants network at a program

Participants network at a program

KCNA and NKnews recently reported on the designation of six new special economic zones (SEZ) in North Korea. This brings the total to… a lot. We are not dwelling on the exact numbers as this policy is still evolving, and we are likely to see more zones spring up.

The article does not mention whether these are the ‘spot SEZs’ of 2-3 square kilometers or the larger ones of 200 square kilometers. We are leaning towards the ’spot SEZs’ guess, at least for some of these areas, as we had local officials from those places attend training earlier these year. It was clear at that point that some of these local zone requests were being processed.

Another positive news that may be coming up, which we recently heard about, is changes to the law that would allow wholly-owned foreign enterprises (WOFE) in the SEZs. Previously, only Rason allowed WOFE set-up. This has not prevented some enterprising service-focused firms to set up in Rason and operate outside of the area. 

Some things we would like to clarity if and when this law surfaces, include

a. How will WOFE in these zones interact with the economy outside of the zones?

Are there rules in place to allow interaction across boundaries? We were told that Rason has pioneered some of these rules, so we hope to see it rolled out across the other zones. As many observers have mentioned, self-contained zones are of limited interest to investors, and provide limited benefit (positive externalities) to the domestic economy.

b. Will enterprising locals “roundtrip”? 

That is, will they partner with foreign investors to set up their own companies in the zones using the foreigners’ name? This would allow individual North Koreans to own companies, potentially provide them with more security over their assets, and reduce their tax rates. While the state might frown on such an activity, one cannot help but sympathize with local entrepreneurs who face onerous and fluctuating calls for “donations”, and an uncertain legal framework. In China’s case, supporting local enterprise, and providing loopholes, apparently pays off for the economy in the long run.

c. Will the law eventually be extended to provide the same opportunities to enterprising locals, allowing them to (belatedly) own their own companies?

We believe that making the business environment more conductive for domestic entrepreneurs is important for reviving the economy and for creating domestic companies that can eventually be competitive regionally.

Financial Times Feature on CE's Business Training

At a simulation exercise involving resource purchases, snowflake making and snowflake selling.

At a simulation exercise involving resource purchases, snowflake making and snowflake selling.

The Financial Times has a piece in its management section on Choson Exchange's training programs in North Korea. It sits behind a paywall. Here is a small excerpt and I strongly recommend you subscribe to FT for its fine journalism, and not just on North Korea:

... More than 180 trainees took part in the first quarter of this year alone.

The courses are designed to support North Korea’s growing numbers of small-business owners, as the state shows increasing flexibility towards breaches of its collectivist official dog­ma in its efforts to revitalise a long-stagnant economy. Most Choson Exchange trainees work at state companies or institutions. But others are running small enterprises, typically restaurants or cafés, and the programme hopes to encourage more Koreans to follow suit.

The sessions in North Korea involve a foreign volunteer – usually an entrepreneur, or a marketing expert – giving a talk on western business practices, with the aid of an interpreter.

“There’s a broad set of vocabulary that is missing” where business is concerned, notes Andray Abrahamian, executive director of Choson Exchange. “When the workshop leader delivers a sentence, the translator might speak for a couple of minutes to make sure the message got through.”


But the full importance of Choson Exchange’s work may become clear only after a North Korean transition to a truly market-based economy, when it would be in dire need of people who understand modern business, says Andrei Lan­kov, a professor at Seoul’s Kookmin University. “They are one of a few groups doing something that makes sense,” he says. “The only way to change North Korea is to expose North Koreans – especially the elite – to some knowledge of the outside world.”

Choson Exchange tackles this in an unusually direct way: by taking its most promising trainees to Singapore to ex­pose them to the cutting edge of Asian capitalism. Permission – and resources – to travel abroad are hard to come by in North Korea, even for Pyongyang residents. Most of the trainees have never left the country, and even the exceptions have nearly always been only to northeast China...


Things Koreans Ask

North Korean conducts an orchestra in Singapore!

North Korean conducts an orchestra in Singapore!

Bringing North Koreans abroad is never easy, especially for those with limited experience living abroad independently. They have so many questions. Their questions reflect the different system they come from, and the limited international immersion they have. Because of their ‘alien’ perspective, their questions force me to think deeply about why things are the way they are. Here is a small sample: 

1.     Why does your government allow all these shops to give discounts? How do they calculate the tax revenue if shops are giving all these discounts?

Because a Singapore without discounts is not Singapore?

2. How can the audit companies regulate their own industry?

Beats me! Ask Arthur Andersen?

3. Who does one go to to get permission to talk to foreigners in your country?

Yo mama!

4. I don’t understand how Singapore became a medical hub. Did you have to go to war to acquire the technology?

Paying your bills helps too.

5. Singaporeans are too international. They study abroad, travel everywhere and work overseas. Their relationship to their country is so weak. How does Singapore keep its people in Singapore?

Parental pressure.

Yanji News: Quanhe River Port Bridge One Step Closer

An article in the Yanji News reports that one step towards a new bridge linking Yanbian with Rason was taken last week:

 China-North Korea Border Ring River Port Bridge Construction Project approved by the Ministry of Environmental Protection

Date: 07/07/2014


A billboard ad by Hunchun City, facing Korea, exhorting pushing forward together to open transportation routes.

A billboard ad by Hunchun City, facing Korea, exhorting pushing forward together to open transportation routes.

The China-North Korea Border Quanhe River Port Bridge Construction is one of the most important construction projects in Hunchun. This project is located at the Hunchun Border Quanhe Port, at the intersection of the low reaches of Tumen River and Quanhe River. It connects Hunchun with the Won Jong Ri in North Korea. The bridge starts from the China Border Port, and ends at the south of the North Korean Joint Inspection Building. The building is still under construction. The bridge will be 920 meters long, and can satisfy the transportation needs between North Korea and China, and stimulate the development of international business between China and North Korea.

The approval of Environmental Impact Statement of this project will lay the foundation of future construction. 

Research and Translation by Wang Xing Yu

Marching towards modern banks or sliding towards 2009?

Visiting a bank to run a workshop on risk management in 2012

Visiting a bank to run a workshop on risk management in 2012

North Korean banks have limited lending function. They function as a service provider, catering to trading companies conducting foreign transactions. Consumer deposits are a small part of bank liabilities, and we have often urged bankers to focus on building a depositor-based banking system to enable a more efficient commercial lending market.

Former World Bank staff and North Korea watcher Brad Babson recently wrote at NKnews about the need for a properly functioning domestic banking system for North Korea to accelerate development. Financial sector development in North Korea is an area we have always been concerned with, not just because our very first in-country program in the country focused on this area, but because easier access to capital is one of the things that domestic entrepreneurs sorely need. We support the growth of the domestic entrepreneurial sector, and capital is something this sector sorely needs.

The most interesting piece of recent news concerning the financial sector was an article published in Kim Il Sung University Gazette about mobilizing ‘idle funds.’ It goes on to say (re-citing from IFES):

The article states the following: “Some of the funds that are being circulated in the market have strayed away from the normal production process and distribution passage and remain harbored in the hands of organizations, enterprises, and people. . . . Mobilization of idle funds shall meet the funding needs of the state and serve as a source of supplementary income to increase state revenue.”

The article adds that “The state should secure idle funds of institutions and enterprises through banks and mobilize idle cash kept by the people through savings and insurance,” and furthermore states that “Banks should concentrate to have control over idle funds.”

If this idea is followed by good policy, it could potentially become a catalyst to the growth of domestic enterprises by enabling savings to be more efficiently channeled into investments. A pessimistic reading of the idea is that this could end up being a confiscatory measure meant to force domestic companies and individuals to pour their foreign currency into state bonds or state banks lending on non-commercial terms. This brings echoes of the 2009 chaos when a currency revaluation accompanied by a cap on the amount of old currency one could exchange into the new one devastated the merchant class and confiscated their wealth.

Some of our team members have toyed with various small-scale ideas on providing capital to small businesses in the country. Bank lending, venture financing, cooperatives, insurance or microfinance are all needed. Greater transparency in the sector, better reporting standards, and access for foreign players can help bring down interest rates. Building confidence in banks among depositors will be a key challenge.

With this new financial system in place, the Central Bank will have to take on an enhanced role managing an unprecedentedly complex financial sector (by DPRK standards). Traditionally, North Korean banks operate with limited oversight from the Central Bank or the Ministry of Finance. Given the Central Bank’s limited experience managing the financial sector, it will have a steep learning curve ahead of it, and this is a curve it needs to climb with greater knowledge assistance.

Hello Kitty, Hello Wonsan

This essay, arguing that if Japan and North Korea stay the course, Wonsan will be the big winner, was originally publish on July 9th, 2014 at 38 North.


Wonsan, on the DPRK’s east coast, by all accounts, used to bustle—at least by DPRK standards. If the recent outreach between Japan and North Korea bears fruit, Wonsan could undergo a 21st century revival.

Since Japan banned all trade with the DPRK in the wake of the disastrous Kim-Koizumi summit of 2002, Wonsan has been a shell of its former self. TheMangyongbong 92—the ferry that once brought both goods and people back and forth—has sat moored at the port since 2006, ill-fated ‘Rason luxury cruises’ notwithstanding.

Of all the planned Special Economic Zones (SEZs) that were announced last year, however, Wonsan will be the one where real change may take place. Compared to the other zones, it is something of a “national focus” that already has had and will continue to receive more central support than the other SEZs. Wonsan currently boasts the Hyondong Industrial Development Zone, a 2 km-square zone embedded in a much larger Special Tourist Zone. The boundaries for the tourist zone seem to not yet be fixed, but will likely extend west all the way past Masikryong (Masik Pass) Ski Resort to Sinpyong, another already designated special tourist area. Ultimately, some in the DPRK envision a zone that links up with Mt. Kumgang, some 150 km south of Wonsan. They have grandiose plans: attracting $100 million investment in tech and light industry at Hyondong, one million visitors per year to Wonsan, and a new international airport. These expectations are ambitious, to use a generous adjective.

One thing is clear, however, and that is for any of these plans to succeed even partly, Wonsan will need Japanese or South Korean investors and visitors—ideally both. Some North Koreans recognize this, even if no one is openly stating that Wonsan needs Japan or South Korea to thrive.

The prospects for improved inter-Korean relations looks tenuous, despite the mood in the South having once shifted towards engagement. President Park Geun-hye has said too many things about her vision of unification by absorption as of late. It is difficult to overstate how much Pyongyang loathes such talk, but they tried their best to convey it with the kind of invective you might expect to hear between football hooligans, not governments.

However, the prospects for some kind of breakthrough between Japan and the DPRK look surprisingly positive. The contemporary impasse between Japan and North Korea has hinged on essentially one issue: the abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 80s by North Korea, and the lack of a clear or credible explanation of the fate of most of the abductees. This issue is far from simple, but compared to dealing with nuclear weapons or ballistic missile issues, which fuel tensions between the DPRK and both China and the US, it is an issue more easily addressed. The latter two go to the very heart of Pyongyang’s security concerns as well as impacting Japan’s security, the trilateral alliance and China’s position as a rising power. The abduction problem is largely about properly acknowledging and possibly repatriating people and remains to the satisfaction of the Japanese families who have a stake in the issue.

A Steady Buildup

In this context, the past year has seen cautious and deliberate progress towards that goal. Japan’s Isao Iijima, an advisor and campaign aide to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, certainly has an interesting travel schedule the past 12 months or so. Last May he visited Pyongyang for meetings. He followed that up in December with a trip to Washington DC in a very under-the-radar fashion, ignoring many of the usual protocols that one would expect for someone of his political stature.

Last October, he held secret talks in Dalian with North Koreans. He may have met them again in Vietnam in January 2014. Then Japanese and DPRK officials held talks in March on the sidelines of two Red Cross meetings in Shenyang, after which they announced that formal government to government discussions would take place.

Also in March 2014, abductee Megumi Yokota’s parents were allowed to meet their granddaughter in Mongolia. They came away from this rather dramatic and no doubt emotional encounter saying: “North Korea has changed a bit,” and maybe now was the right time to conclude the abductee issue. (They were apparently invited to Pyongyang to meet their great-granddaughter for the first time in May, but that seems to have not transpired.)

The two countries had further working-level talks between bureaucrats at the end of March in Beijing and have had other meetings in Shanghai. This led to a meeting inSweden in late May, at which Japan promised to lift a portion of its unilateral sanctions on North Korea once Pyongyang sets up an investigation committee and starts a “comprehensive and full-scale survey of all Japanese” including abductees.

On July 1, at a meeting in Beijing, Pyongyang informed Tokyo not only of the establishment of a new investigation into the issue, but also provided a list confirming thatat least 10 abductees are still living in North Korea. This was beyond what most observers expected and is a good start toward mollifying Japanese public opinion, which is of crucial importance if there is to be continued progress. Japan’s cabinet on Friday confirmed some of the autonomous sanctions would be lifted. Money transfers were made easier, as was travel between the two countries. Importantly, exports to the DPRK are still forbidden and DPRK-flagged ships can only port in Japan for humanitarian purposes. Trade will have to wait and the Mangyongbong-92 will, for now, remain moored in Wonsan, a symbol of Japan’s judicious caution.

Indeed, Japan has been very deliberate in its step-by-step approach, while also displaying a keen understanding of the kind of buy-in they need from institutions and individuals in Pyongyang. Furthermore, on the domestic front, Abe has the conservative résumé—perhaps as President Nixon did when he reached out to China—to fend off complaints from his country’s vitriolic right-wingers. His party’s position is also sound, with an opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) that is disorganized and weak. The abduction issue is close to Prime Minister Abe’s heart. He came to prominence on the back of it in the early 2000s under former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and solving this problem would be a huge feather in his cap.

Beyond the potential political windfall, Japan would be keen to get its hands on North Korea’s large, unexploited deposits of rare earth minerals, necessary for the production of pretty much all electronics. China controls 80 percent of the world’s production of these minerals and as China-Japan relations remain tense, this has been a source of concern for Japanese businesses.

As for the North Koreans, they are desperate to diversify economic relations away from China. A deal with Japan would also put greater pressure on Seoul to find ways to get involved in North Korea’s economy. The South has already conceded much influence to China since the end of the “Sunshine” era and would be loathe to see another neighbor take advantage of the North’s resources.

However, Pyongyang and Tokyo are both quite reasonably worried that a deal could yet fall apart—they thought they had nailed normalization in 2002, only to have it blow up in their faces. Indeed, Kim Jong Il and Junichiro Koizumi’s miscalculation of how the abductions admission would play in Japan proved paralyzing. Japanese right wingers, with Abe as an ally, poured fuel on the fire; North Korea compounded this with further claims on the issue that seemed less than credible. From Pyongyang’s perspective, they risked a lot in 2002 and they can’t afford to have this attempt also fail, causing another decade absent Japanese trade.

In fact, the reparations/aid package that the two countries were moving towards in the early 2000s is almost certainly not in the cards any time soon: after all, from Japan’s perspective, the missiles and nuclear weapons are still an issue and they can’t strike out too far from their allies. For now, a resumption of trade and port calls for Korean ships will probably be enough of a goal for Pyongyang. It’s hard to believe when one looks at North Korea’s current dependence on China, but throughout the 1990s, trade with Japan was almost a great as trade with the PRC.

Wonsan and Japan

Throughout the late twentieth century, Wonsan was always considered a resort town, an idea being reclaimed with vigor by Kim Jong Un.

Wonsan will never be Busan or even Nampo, but it has long been a link to the center of the peninsula for Japan, first driven by the discovery of gold in the region in the 1880s. The gold boom gave locals purchasing power that other provinces did not enjoy, making it an outlet for Japanese goods since before the colonial period.[1]

In the 1960s it became the locus of Japanese-Korean repatriation. The emotional and social incentives for repatriation waned in the late 1960s and 1970s, but following a 1979 change in Japanese law, visitation (and return to Japan) was allowed for pro-North Koreans resident in Japan. In the 1980s, the Mangyongbong ferry ran dozens of times a year, bringing hundreds of visitors a month.[2] It also brought businesspeople who connected Korean-Japanese businesses with the homeland.

People and goods used to flow regularly through Wonsan—visitors to the city in the early 2000s described the food products, electronics and cars, as all being Japanese.

Today, there are few foreign tourists and the TVs are Chinese. What Wonsan needs most (or at least first) in order to reclaim its former glory—more than skiiers and ‘light-industrialists’—is traders and Korean-Japanese visitors. If the export and shipping ban were to be lifted, this would very quickly foster two-way trade through Wonsan. Moreover, because the DPRK’s economic environment has continued to become more “private-ish” than it was when trade was shut down, one could expect a greater diversity of actors and perhaps a wider disbursement of profits.

Chongryon (the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan; the organizational home of pro-North Koreans in Japan) may not be what it once was, with fewer members and less economic clout than in days gone by (in fact, this is not unrelated to the negative PR from the abduction issue). But there are hundreds, if not thousands, of pro-North Korean Japanese businesspeople ready to move once the rules relax. And while some of Pyongyang’s plans for Wonsan are pie-in-the-sky, there are changes taking place on the ground already. Several hotels and other facilities are being refurbished. Indeed, conversion of the scenic Kalma Peninsula from an Air Force retreat to a tourist resort was completed last year (though military live fire exercises still take place in the area).

If Pyongyang and Tokyo can put something together, Wonsan will be the big winner, first from visitors and imports, then perhaps through export of resources to Japan.

It is important to recall, however, that in 1992, Japanese interest in North Korea was quite strong, with a number of high profile businesspeople taking part in a large trade mission that year. Within months, this interest was shunted aside as the DPRK’s missile and nuclear programs took center stage. Wonsan will be hoping that the recent progress between Pyongyang and Tokyo isn’t similarly undone.


[1] Kirk W. Larsen, Trade, Dependency and Colonialism in Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia, Charles K. Armstrong et. al eds. (M.E. Sharpe: New York, 2005) 55-57.

[2] Sonia Ryang, Koreans in Japan: Critical Voices from the Margin (Routledge: New York, 2005) 40.

The Female Factor

On June 11, the Institute for Far Eastern Studies and Friedrich Naumann Foundation hosted a conference with the snappy title: "North Korea’s Development Capacity and International Cooperation for Knowledge Sharing: Gender, Agriculture, and Tourism Perspectives." The conference brought together practitioners in these diverse fields with scholars to examine and discuss some of the ongoing exchanges taking place in these diverse fields. 

Choson Exchange's Nils Weisensee went along to present a paper on CE's Women in Business program as we approach its 18 month anniversary.

The Women in Business program has seen:

130+ female participants since launch
40+ different institutions represented by women
7 provinces represented in programs 
15-20% selectivity for overseas programs

We encourage you to download and peruse the paper, which explains and contextualizes such nuggets.

Paper Abstract:

Since the initiation of its Women in Business (WIB) program in 2012, Choson Exchange (CE) has been training more than 130 female North Koreans in business, finance, and law. Several dozen competitively selected participants have been taken to Singapore for study trips on international business practices and policy-making. The WIB program focuses on women because ambitious female professionals in the emergent small and medium enterprise sector (SME) are increasingly driving economic change in the DPRK. Feedback from participants and North Korean partners on this initiative has been very encouraging. Therefore, CE plans to expand both its workshop series in the DPRK, as well as the study trips to Singapore. CE also works to reduce some of the hurdles that prevent North Koreans from starting a business by providing mentorship, a network of peers, and possibly funding to get startups off the ground. Having strong local partners, as well as programs on both macro-economic policies and micro-economic business skills, puts CE into a position to scale its impact as much as donor support permits.

The paper is available here.

Borderland Cafes (or "we're not obsessed with coffee, but...")

Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture in China is a fascinating place. Its major city, Yanji, has experienced a huge economic boom in recent years. Connections with wealthy South Korea grow every year, new apartment blocks are springing up everywhere and it is soon to be connected to high-speed rail. In the area, three or four distinct Korean cultures intermingle: Korean-Chinese from the prefecture, Korean-Chinese from outside, North Koreans and South Koreans.

Gabeeyang interior and baking cubby hole

Gabeeyang interior and baking cubby hole

It is largely due to the latter than Yanji is probably the best coffee town in China, with roasters, specialty shops and huge student hangouts: cafes the size of basketball courts. Its a region where you won't find a Starbucks, but you can find yourself a hand-drip cup of Sidamo, when in season.

If you happen to be in the area, say, in order to run Rason's first ever business workshop last month, you should consider getting your coffee-fix on the border. Coffee in Rason has yet to impress (not the greatest of its issues, though).

Yanji has a broad selection of cafes, too numerous to list here, but the standout for this bean-hound* is Gabeeyang Cafe, an outpost of a very small South Korean chain. 

Uni students: their expressions don't reflect the quality of the choco-caramel whatevers they were drinking.

Uni students: their expressions don't reflect the quality of the choco-caramel whatevers they were drinking.

They have outstanding, bright, fruity espresso shots, a selection of single-origin cafes and all the K-pop you can handle. They roast on-premises. Gabeeyang is located just east of the Yanbian University, below Gina's Place, a popular western hangout with a menu that reminds you of food you liked back home.

Other noteworthy mentions in that neighborhood are the massive Wan Cafe, right across from the university main gate, and a Hands Coffee, a block west of that.

Some 45 kilometers away, one finds Tumen City, which now boasts a handful of coffeeshops, having only gotten streetlights a few years ago. It has a small town feel that most of us don't experience regularly in China and has turned itself into a DPRK-watching tourist destination, from which you can peer across at the denizens of Namyang going about their lives.

This chap recommends a wide stance for North Korea watching - Namyang sits quietly across the river.

This chap recommends a wide stance for North Korea watching - Namyang sits quietly across the river.

There are two more Hands coffeeshops in town, further outposts of a growing South Korean chain that usually features a distinctive yellow and purple LA-lakers decor (which sounds ugly, but isn't so bad). 

Big Hands

Big Hands

There are two more Hands coffeeshops in town, further outposts of a South Korean chain that seems to be anchoring in Yanbian for its China-franchising strategy.  The bigger of the two has pride of place on a recently developed public square right by the Tumen river. 

It actively courts the South Korean tourist won and provides views of Korean mountains and the banks of the Tumen River. The space is well designed for its purpose, with high ceilings and an entirely glass facade.

There are also three Hands cafes in Yanji and at least one in Longjing, another border town. They all serve the same quality, dark roasted blend that provides a solid, traditional Italian style espresso. Crucially, they also do refills. 

The vocational school that houses Green Apple

The vocational school that houses Green Apple

.Also in Tumen is the Green Apple Cafe, run by the avuncular Bob Granger. It is attached to the Tumen River Vocational School, which was set up by a Christian group to provide education to under-privileged Korean-Chinese students.

South Korean Tourists Welcome!

South Korean Tourists Welcome!

If you want run into one of the six western expats in Tumen (seriously), this is the spot. The coffee here tasted somewhat less curated than in other Yanji cafes, but the fresh-baked breads and pastries would best most in the region.

One should note, again, that to find three cafes in a Chinese backwater of less than 150,000 people is remarkable. It seems incongruous that there are bubbles of bourgeois cosmopolitanism in a place that in some ways is so utterly provincial and has some of that unruly energy one finds in borderlands all over the developing world. Yanbian has had a front-row seat for much of modern Sino-Korean history, with colonial migrations, wars, famine, cultural tensions, North Korean refugees and finally, the kind of economic growth that allows middle class travelers to enjoy an espresso in the morning. One hopes the demographic of locals that can afford such treats continues to expand. Even if they're ordering choco-caramel frappes.

Green Apple Interior

Green Apple Interior


*I know, I know.